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Labor Law Illiteracy: Epic Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis and Janus v. AFSCME 
 
 
Michael J. Yelnosky* 
 
Labor law’s profile has long been receding. Private sector 
union density, at 6.5 percent, is almost thirty percent below its high 
in 1954.1 And the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which 
governs labor relations in the private sector, became law in 1935 
and has been substantially amended only twice—the last time in 
1959.2 Cindy Estlund, a leading scholar of labor and employment 
law, has identified this statutory stasis as partly responsible for 
what she calls the “ossification” of American labor law.3 In The 
Death of Labor Law?, Estlund explored the related decline in the 
attention paid to the subject by legal scholars.4 “For much of the 
twentieth century,” she wrote, “labor law scholars were at the 
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1. Drew Silver, American Unions Membership Declines as Public  
Support Fluctuates, Pew Res. Ctr. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails 
-far-behind-public-support/ [https://perma.cc/8DGJ-298V]; see also U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release: Union Members 
Summary (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/Z9RT-VR32] [hereinafter Economic News 
Release]. 
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
3. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1531 (2002) (“I know of no other major American legal 
regime—no other body of federal law that governs a whole domain of social 
life—that has been so insulated from significant change for so long.”). 
4. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Death of Labor Law?, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 105 (2006). 
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forefront of the legal academy. The field drew leading figures in 
academic law ......... Nowadays, by contrast, labor law is regarded as 
a virtual backwater in the legal academy.”5 Most contemporary 
labor law scholarship, she observed, is focused on explanations for 
the decline of private sector unionization.6 
Estlund’s focus is federal labor law, which governs the rights 
and responsibilities of employees, unions, and employers in the 
private sector.7 Public sector labor law, by contrast, never even had 
its day in the sun. While there are examples of prominent legal 
scholars turning their attention to public sector labor law, the 
subject is mostly ignored in American law schools and, if not 
ignored, viewed as arcane and insignificant. A brief internet search 
did not turn up a single course in public sector labor law being 
offered in the fall of 2018 at any law school in New England. 
One practical explanation for the fate of public sector labor law 
is that it is state law, unlike private sector labor law, which consists 
almost   exclusively   of   one   federal statute—the  NLRA. The 
patchwork quilt of applicable state laws can be confounding. It is 
simply more difficult for interested observers to become experts. 
On the other hand, public sector unions are thriving as compared 
to their private sector counterparts. Union density in the public 
sector, at 34.4 percent, is more than five times higher than it is in 
the private sector.8 And changes to public sector labor law have 
found their way into the national consciousness from time to time.9 
Nevertheless, the proposition that public and private sector labor 
law and labor unions do not occupy a significant place in the 
minds of academic or practicing lawyers is not controversial. Nor 
should the suggestion that labor law illiteracy—a knowledge gap 
among lawyers and judges about the content, purpose, operation, 
and  significance  of  labor law—is increasing. In this Survey, I 
describe how the majority’s reasoning in two United States 
 
5.    Id. at 106. 
6.    Id. at 113. 
7. Id. at 113–14. 
8. Economic News Release, supra note 1. 
9. See Noam Scheiber, Can Weak Unions Get Teachers More Money?, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/sunday-review/ 
unions-teachers-money-strike.html [https://perma.cc/GLM2-KMUC]. Recent 
examples include the 2011 amendments to the public sector labor laws in 
Wisconsin championed by Governor Scott Walker as well as a series of teacher 
walkouts in Oklahoma, Arizona, and West Virginia in early 2018. 
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Supreme Court decisions from the 2017 term reflect notable labor 
law illiteracy. Specifically, it appears that a majority of the Justices 
do not understand basic principles of labor law under the NLRA.10 
Moreover, the majority seems to know that collective bargaining in 
the public sector can increase the cost of government operations and 
has concluded that is a justification for interpreting that law to 
curtail the power of public sector unions. The majority finds the 
tendency of collective bargaining in the public sector to increase the 
cost of government operations prima facie unacceptable, even 
though a primary purpose of labor law, perhaps even its raison 
d’etre, is to improve the bargaining power of individual employees, 
which is likely to result in better terms and conditions of 
employment for organized workers, including increased wages and 
benefits.11 Reading these decisions makes one wonder whether 
some of the Justices are aware that in the NLRA, Congress—to 
whom the conservative majority regularly pledges fealty as the 
preeminent policy-making body under our constitutional 
structure— 
[D]eclared [it] to be the policy of the United States to . . . 
encourage the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and . . . protect[] the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation 
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of 
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment 
or other mutual aid or protection.12 
The first of the cases is Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, where the 
Court faced a question about the scope of the NLRA.13 As a general 
matter, the NLRA prohibits employer interference with employee 
rights created by section 7 of the Act, including the right to “engage 
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”14 The specific question before 
 
 
10. See infra pp. 110–13. 
11. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–32 (2018); see also 
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). 
12. 29 U.S.C § 151. 
13. See 138 S. Ct. at 1619. 
14. 29 U.S.C. § 157. This statute provides: “employees shall have the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
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the Court in Epic Systems was whether provisions in employment 
contracts prohibiting employees from joining as plaintiffs in 
arbitration to enforce their rights to appropriate compensation 
under state and federal law were unenforceable under the NLRA.15 
Epic Systems was a group of consolidated cases, and the Court 
described one in some detail.16 The plaintiff, a junior accountant at 
Ernst & Young, believed that his position had been misclassified as 
exempt from the overtime pay requirements of federal and state 
law. He sued Ernst & Young in federal court for overtime pay on 
behalf of a class of Ernst & Young junior accountants.17 Ernst & 
Young moved for an order compelling individual arbitration of the 
plaintiff’s claim.18 Ernst & Young relied on an agreement the 
plaintiff signed as a condition of employment, which provided he 
would arbitrate any employment disputes he had with Ernst & 
Young and that he would assert claims only on his own behalf with 
claims “‘pertaining to different [e]mployees [to] be heard in separate 
proceedings.’”19 
The district court granted the motion, relying on the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion for support.20 The FAA, enacted 
by Congress in 1925, provides: 
[A] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.21 
And in Concepcion, the Court concluded that the FAA preempted 
 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection . . . .” Id. Further, section 158(a)(1) protects those 
rights by making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 
157 of this title.” Id. § 158(a)(1). 
15. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1620. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Morris v. Ernst & 
Young, No. C-12-04964, 2013 WL 3460052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2005). 
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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California law making a class action waiver in the arbitration 
provision of a consumer contract unenforceable.22 The Court 
explained that because class arbitration was inconsistent with the 
fundamental attributes of arbitration, a state law requiring class 
arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA.23 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s arbitration order 
in Epic Systems because it concluded the NLRA’s protection of 
concerted activity trumped the FAA’s directive to enforce 
arbitration agreements.24 The Ninth Circuit majority explained 
that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement prohibited 
employees from engaging in concerted activity for mutual aid or 
protection, a right expressly protected by the NLRA.25 
The Supreme Court reversed, 5–4, holding that nothing in the 
NLRA rendered the class arbitration waiver unenforceable.26 
Justice Gorsuch, writing for his conservative brethren, went so far 
as to assert that “as a matter of law the answer is clear.”27 Even 
granting that the winners get to write history, this is an astonishing 
assertion. 
Almost as astonishing was the articulated basis of the Court’s 
conclusion—that the NLRA could not possibly have anything to do 
with the FAA and arbitration agreements because it “secures to 
employees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it 
says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal 
disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or 
arbitral forum.”28 Assuming the majority opinion was not 
intentionally misleading, the majority’s reasoning is clear evidence 
of labor law illiteracy. 
On one hand, the majority in Epic Systems was correct when it 
explained that, under Concepcion, state law prohibiting 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement “just because it requires 
bilateral arbitration” must give way to the FAA’s general command 
to enforce arbitration agreements.29 However, that misses the 
point entirely. Concepcion involved an arbitration agreement 
 
22. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343. 
23. Id. 
24. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620. 
25. Id. 
26.    Id. at 1631. 
27.    Id. at 1618. 
28.    Id. at 1619. 
29. See id. at 1623. 
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between consumers and their wireless network provider.30 Epic 
Systems, by contrast, involved an agreement between employees 
and their employer.31 
Because of the NLRA that makes all the difference. The NLRA 
gives employees the right, as the majority acknowledged, to form 
unions and engage in collective bargaining, but also “to engage in 
other concerted activities for . . . other mutual aid or protection.”32 
It is hornbook labor law that the NLRA’s “protection of ‘other 
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection’ extends 
beyond . . . efforts to form a union and engage in collective 
bargaining.”33 
Indeed, a unanimous Supreme Court held in 1962 in NLRB v. 
Washington Aluminum Co., that an employer committed an unfair 
labor practice under the NLRA when it disciplined seven non-union 
employees for engaging in a spontaneous walkout to protest what 
they considered to be an unacceptably cold workplace.34 The 
employees did not walk out to form a union or to engage in collective 
bargaining.35 The Court nevertheless found the walkout protected 
because the employees were acting in concert to protest their 
conditions of employment.36 Employees, the Court explained, do 
not “lose their right to engage in concerted activities under § 7 [of 
the NLRA] merely because they do not present a specific demand 
upon their employer to remedy a condition they find 
objectionable.”37 The Court continued: 
The fact that the company was already making every effort 
to repair the furnace and bring heat into the shop that 
morning does not change the nature of the controversy that 
caused the walkout. At the very most, that fact might tend 
to indicate that the conduct of the men in leaving was 
unnecessary and unwise, and it has long been settled that 
the reasonableness of workers’ decisions to engage in 
 
 
30. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333. 
31. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1616. 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
33. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR 
LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 397 (2d ed. 2004). 
34. 370 U.S. 9, 18 (1962). 
35. See id. at 15–16. 
36. Id. at 14. 
37. Id. 
 110 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:104 
concerted activity is irrelevant ....... 38 
Remarkably, the Epic Systems majority concluded that this 
seminal Supreme Court case on the breadth of section 7 warranted 
a simple citation, where it was characterized as a case involving 
efforts of a group of employees “related to organizing and collective 
bargaining.”39 
That characterization patently misunderstands Washington 
Aluminum and the support it gives to the proposition that 
employees wishing to join together as plaintiffs in a Fair Labor 
Standards Act proceeding are engaging in concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection.40 The protection of that right by the 
NLRA, which was enacted thirteen years after the FAA, justifies an 
exception to the general command of the FAA. Moreover, as Justice 
Ginsburg noted for the dissenters, the NLRA is specific about the 
rights it creates for employees, while the FAA says nothing about 
collective proceedings in arbitration.41 Her dissent is simple and 
direct—conditioning employment on an agreement to refrain from 
engaging in section 7 activity is an unfair labor practice, and that 
makes enforcement of such an agreement unlawful as a matter of 
federal law.42 
In short, my critique of Epic Systems is that the majority never 
really joins the issue because of what appears to be its fundamental 
misunderstanding of a basic tenet of American labor law—that 
collective employee action in support of improved wages and 
working conditions is protected even if that action is not related to 
unionization or collective bargaining. 
The trouble with the majority opinion in Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
is different but related: the opinion displays a hostility to the 
concept of unionization and collective bargaining in the public 
 
38. Id. at 16. 
39. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018) (citing 
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 13). 
40. Moreover, as early as 1942 the National Labor Relations Board found 
that three employees who joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit asserting violations 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act were engaged in concerted activity for mutual 
aid or protection. In re Spandsco Oil & Royalty, 42 N.L.R.B. 942 (1942). And 
many federal courts continued to do so. See, e.g., Brady v. Nat’l Football 
League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (1991). 
41. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 1641–42. 
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sector, which is a policy choice the Court obviously understands 
that states are permitted to make for themselves.43 The Janus 
majority declared unconstitutional collective bargaining provisions 
that required public employees who were represented by but 
opposed to joining a union to pay for the costs of union 
representation.44 Requiring the payment of these so-called “agency 
fees,” the majority held, was a compelled subsidy of speech that 
violated the First Amendment rights of employee objectors.45 
The union argued, among other things, that the Court should 
characterize the speech being subsidized—arguments made by 
union representatives in negotiations over wage increases, for 
example—as speech about matters of private concern, speech that 
is generally entitled to less First Amendment protection in public 
sector employment.46 The Janus majority rejected that argument 
and concluded that all speech connected to collective bargaining in 
the public sector involves matters of public concern.47 
In so doing, Justice Alito revealed a hostility toward collective 
bargaining in the public sector when he went beyond explaining 
why First Amendment rights were genuinely at stake in public 
sector agency fee arrangements.48 He could have made this First 
Amendment point by simply explaining that collective bargaining 
in the public sector involves speech that has an impact on the cost 
and operation of government, core matters of public concern. 
Instead, he piled on by describing, in some detail, massive budget 
deficits and unfunded pension liabilities plaguing states, counties, 
and municipalities—deficits that he attributed to public sector 
collective bargaining.49 
He went on to describe bargaining between AFSCME and the 
State of Illinois in a way that suggested the union was irresponsible 
 
 
43. See 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
44. Id. at 2460. 
45. Id. 
46.    Id. at 2474. 
47.    Id. at 2460. 
48. See id. at 2474–76. 
49. Id. (explaining that: (1) Illinois’s credit rating has been downgraded to 
near junk status because of unfunded pension and retiree healthcare 
liabilities; (2) the nationwide cost of state and local employees’ wages and 
benefits is nearly $1.5 trillion—more than half of those jurisdictions’ total 
expenditures; and (3) many States and cities struggle with unfunded pension 
and retiree healthcare liabilities and other budget issues). 
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in responding to the State’s demands to reduce its employment- 
related expenses: 
But when the State offered cost-saving proposals on these 
issues, the Union countered with very different 
suggestions. Among other things, it advocated wage and 
tax increases, cutting spending “to Wall Street financial 
institutions,” and reforms to Illinois’ pension and tax 
systems (such as closing “corporate tax loopholes,” 
“[e]xpanding the base of the state sales tax,” and “allowing 
an income tax that is adjusted in accordance with ability 
to pay”).50 
Skepticism about the social value of collective bargaining in the 
public sector can be seen in another aspect of the majority’s opinion. 
The majority cited favorably to an amicus brief submitted by two 
former general counsels to the Governor of Illinois, both of whom 
regularly advised the Governor on how the State should proceed in 
public sector labor negotiations.51 The majority cited the brief for 
details about the finances of the State of Illinois, but the narrative 
of the brief is clear—collective bargaining in the public sector is bad 
public policy.52 The following excerpt from the brief is a good 
example: 
The causes of Illinois’s financial woes are longstanding and 
bipartisan. Yet much of the State’s current financial 
condition results from the conflation of public sector union 
bargaining  and legislative lobbying ............ Unlike private 
sector unions, which pit labor against management in 
meaningful negotiations, public sector unions permit labor 
and management to sit on the same side of the table. There 
they purport to bargain with the taxpayers’ money.53 
While there is little dispute that private and public sector 
collective bargaining are different, with the outcome of the former 
determined more by market forces and the latter by political forces, 
 
50. Id. at 2475. 
51. Id. at 2475 nn.12–13. 
52. Id. at 2475. 
53. Brief for Jason R. Barclay & James S. Montana, Jr., Former General 
Counsel to Governors of the State of Illinois, as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 4, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 6311777. 
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there is genuine and good faith disagreement about whether 
facilitating collective bargaining in the public sector is bad public 
policy. For example, Professor Clyde Summers, one of the leading 
labor law scholars of his generation, wrote that with regard to 
monetary issues like wages, public sector collective bargaining 
helps level the playing field for public employees who will often be 
dramatically outnumbered by citizens opposed to tax increases.54 
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy seemed positively 
dismissive of the argument made by the Solicitor General of the 
State of Illinois, David L. Franklin, who explained that agency fee 
agreements furthered the State’s interest in having well-funded 
and stable public sector unions to serve as partners in management 
of the State’s workforce and the effective provision of public 
services. 
MR. FRANKLIN: [W]e have an interest at the end of the 
day in being able to work with a stable, responsible, 
independent counterparty that’s well-resourced enough 
that it can be a partner with us in the process of not only 
contract negotiation. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: It can be a partner with you in 
advocating for a greater size workforce, against 
privatization, against merit promotion, against—for 
teacher tenure, for higher wages, for massive government, 
for increasing bonded indebtedness, for increasing taxes? 
That’s—that’s the interest the state has?55 
Of course, justices often play “devil’s advocate” during oral 
argument, but I am willing to bet that is not what Justice Kennedy 
was doing when he conveyed to the State’s lawyer that he views 
public sector collective bargaining largely, if not completely, as a 
 
54. Clyde Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441, 446–47 (2003). Other arguments in favor of public 
sector collective bargaining include: (1) that it reduces workplace conflict by 
creating regular avenues for dialogue between labor and management; (2) that 
it facilitates workplace democracy; and (3) that it facilitates worker 
engagement in the political process. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee 
Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A Perspective from The United 
States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 281 (2013). 
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, 
Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466). 
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means to transfer wealth from taxpayers to public employees. 
* * * * * * * 
Supreme Court justices are not immune from the social, 
academic, and political trends that have made labor law less 
salient. Indeed, as the professional backgrounds of the Justices 
become more homogeneous, it might be even more likely that the 
Court will not have a labor law expert among its number. But it 
does not take an expert to see that something is amiss in Epic 
Systems and Janus. Indeed, I would be disappointed if one of my 
Labor Law students did not see the deficiency in Justice Gorsuch’s 
opinion in Epic Systems. 
However, I should acknowledge that perhaps I am seeing 
something that is not there. The approach in Epic Systems could 
be explained by the Court’s capacious interpretation of the FAA, 
which at this point essentially requires enforcement of any form of 
covered arbitration agreement.56 And in Janus, the majority may 
have been laser-focused on explaining why it was rejecting the 
argument that public sector collective bargaining did not involve 
genuine issues of public concern. It may have simply gotten carried 
away. 
Still, at the end of the day, I am struck by the lack of 
sophistication and rigor in the Epic Systems and Janus majority 
opinions. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise that the Court’s 
facility with labor law is, like the field in general, in decline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration 
Jurisprudence: How The Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., 129, 131–32 (2012). 
